Incomplete/improper integration of societal values with the risk assessment and/or unclear decision rules We present a summary of these criticisms with supporting citations in Table 1. NRA processes and the NRR outputs have been criticized on other grounds in a wide range of writings. Furthermore, recent analysis has argued that a consequence-uncertainty (C,U) definition of risk is more valid and useful when characterizing global and national risks than the (C,P) representation (Aven, 2017, 2020), and it is notable that uncertainty (and the strength of knowledge it is based upon) is not fully captured in many NRA/NRRs. There may be lack of public engagement and awareness of the NRA/NRR (Hiscock & Jones, 2017), or the NRA itself is classified (Boyd & Wilson, 2021). However, this common practice of presenting a two-dimensional risk matrix often obscures uncertainties, stakeholder disagreements on values, bias, and systemic errors (Mamuji & Etkin, 2019). Darker colors (purple, red, orange) represent more salient risks than lighter colors (yellow, green, blue). The risk matrix is a two-dimensional communication tool that “represents risk,” often while attempting to avoid spurious precision about probability or impact by placing risks in categories (see Figure 1).Ī probability-impact risk matrix. A majority of OECD countries performing NRA communicate results in some form of national risk register (NRR) and/or consequence-probability (C,P) risk matrix (OECD, 2017). The focus is short-term (less than 5 years) so that resources are “not wasted” (OECD, 2017). NRAs tend to exclude risks with low probability and have not usually been intended as an exhaustive register of all civil emergencies although lists of “risks under review” may be maintained, as in the United Kingdom (Stock & Wentworth, 2019), and Switzerland maintains a “Hazard Catalog” from which hazards are selected for further analysis in NRAs (FOCP, 2020). NRA processes, such as those of the Netherlands (Veland et al., 2013) and the United Kingdom (Stock & Wentworth, 2019) involve development of risk scenarios of national significance, which are then evaluated in terms of their multicriteria impact and multicomponent likelihood. The process is typically demanding, complex, multidisciplinary, and cross-sectoral. NRA often takes an all-hazards approach assessing natural hazards, infectious diseases, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks, labor strikes, cyberattacks, organized crime or the failure of institutions (OECD, 2017). Many countries undertake the process of national risk assessment (NRA) to evaluate risks of national significance (OECD, 2017 Poljanšek et al., 2019). The most important factors for an “all hazards” approach to NRA are ensuring license for key assumptions and that all the salient risks are included before proceeding to ranking of risks and considering resource allocation and value. We outline the first component of such a tool for communication and exploration of risks and assumptions. We advocate for a deliberative public tool that can support informed two-way communication between stakeholders and governments. Widespread engagement with an informed public and experts would legitimize key assumptions, encourage critique of knowledge, and ease shortcomings of NRAs. We highlight the substantial uncertainty inherent in NRAs and argue that this is reason for more engagement with stakeholders and experts. Under a highly conservative approach that considers only simple probability and impact metrics, the use of significant discount rates, and harms only to those currently alive at the time, we find these risks have likely salience far greater than their omission from national risk registers might suggest. We then identify a neglected set of large-scale risks that are seldom included in NRAs, namely global catastrophic risks and existential threats to humanity. Using a demonstration set of risks, we illustrate how NRA process assumptions around time horizon, discount rate, scenario choice, and decision rule impact on risk characterization and therefore any subsequent ranking. Two key shortcomings of national risk assessments (NRAs) are: (1) lack of justification and transparency around important foundational assumptions of the process, (2) omission of almost all the largest scale risks.
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